

Linux/Moose endangered or extinct?

An update on this atypical embedded Linux botnet

by Olivier Bilodeau



\$ apropos

- Statically linked stripped ELF challenges
- Moose DNA (description)
- Moose Herding (the Operation)
- A Strange Animal
- Latest Developments



\$ whoami

- Malware Researcher at ESET
- Infosec lecturer at ETS University in Montreal
- Previously
 - infosec developer, network admin, linux system admin
- Co-founder Montrehack (hands-on security workshops)
- Founder NorthSec Hacker Jeopardy




Static/stripped ELF primer


- No imports (library calls) present
- All the code bundled together down to kernel syscall
- Disassembler (if available for arch) doesn't help much



Linux/Moose binary in IDA




printf family




B60 00417B60: vsnprintf











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Ecosystem makes it worst [for reversers]

- GCC and GNU libc is always changing so compiled binaries always change
- Little IDA FLIRT signatures available (if any)
- μClibc, eglibc, glibc, musl, ...



A Failed Attempt

- Map syscalls with IDA script
- But libc is too big it is still too much



Better Solution

- Reproduce environment (arch, libc/compiler versions)
- Build libraries w/ symbols under same conditions
- Use bindiff to map library functions
- Focus on malware code



100									
similarity	confider	change	EA primary	name primary	EA secondary	name secondary	con	algorithm	matched bas
0.99	0.99	-IE	00419BE0	sub_419BE0_282	00037E60	strncmp		MD index matching (flowg	21
0.99	0.99	-IE	00423F20	sub_423F20_444	00034C20	fgets		edges flowgraph MD index	18
0.99	0.99	-IE	004228D0	sub_4228D0_435	0002D650	stdio_WRITE		edges flowgraph MD index	17
0.99	0.99	-IE	0041B634	sub_41B634_308	0003E7A4	inet_pton4		edges flowgraph MD index	21
0.99	0.99	-IE	004261A0	sub_4261A0_471	0002D790	stdio_adjust_position		edges flowgraph MD index	21
0.99	0.99	-IE	00423010	sub_423010_438	0002E1B0	stdio_trans2w_o		edges flowgraph MD index	17
0.99	0.99	-IE	004277D0	sub_4277D0_485	0003F2E0	encode_dotted		edges flowgraph MD index	17
0.99	0.99	-IE	00424790	sub_424790_448	000362F0	fgets_unlocked		edges flowgraph MD index	19
0.99	0.99	-IE	00424050	sub_424050_445	00035BB0	_stdio_openlist_dec_use		edges flowgraph MD index	44
0.99	0.99	-IE	0041B734	sub_41B734_310	0003E89C	inet_ntop		edges flowgraph MD index	63
0.99	0.99	-	004176FC	sub_4176FC_237	000107E4	opendir		edges flowgraph MD index	11
0.99	0.99	-IE	00424FF0	sub_424FF0_456	0003EE60	inet_aton		edges flowgraph MD index	17
0.99	0.99	-IE	004189B0	sub_4189B0_260	00030540	_ppfs_init		edges flowgraph MD index	16
0.99	0.99	-IE	00419670	sub_419670_268	00036810	fwrite_unlocked		edges flowgraph MD index	15
0.99	0.99	-IE	00418218	sub_418218_259	0002FDA8	_vfprintf_internal		edges flowgraph MD index	136
0.99	0.99	-IE	00419318	sub_419318_265	000354F0	putchar		address sequence	50
0.99	0.99	-IE	00425F00	sub_425F00_469	0002CF30	fseeko64		edges flowgraph MD index	32
0.99	0.99	-IE	0041FD70	sub_41FD70_384	0004E960	raise		edges flowgraph MD index	15
0.99	0.99	-IE	004224C0	sub_4224C0_431	00024690	wcsnrtombs		edges flowgraph MD index	19
0.99	0.99	-IE	00423DC0	sub_423DC0_443	00034AC0	getc		instruction count	48
0.99	0.99	-IE	0041B4D0	sub_41B4D0_307	0003E640	inet_ntop4		edges flowgraph MD index	11
0.99	0.99	-IE	004285E0	sub_4285E0_495	00051DD0	fixdfsi		edges flowgraph MD index	13
0									

Moose DNA

aka Malware description

Hang tight, this is a recap




Linux/Moose...

Named after the string "elan" present in the malware executable

```
00028fc3 6E 67 00 00 00 70 61 73 73 77 6F 72 64 3A 00 00 00 ng...password:...
00028fd4 75 74 68 65 6E 74 69 63 61 74 69 6F 6E 20 66 61 69 uthentication fai 00028fe5 6C 65 64 00 00 00 00 73 68 0D 0A 00 00 00 00 70 73 led...sh....ps
00028ff6 0D 0A 65 63 68 6F 20 2D 6E 20 2D 65 20 22 48 33 6C lecho -n -e "H31 00029007 4C 30 57 6F 52 6C 44 22 0D 0A 63 68 6D 6F 64 0D 0A loworld"..chmod..
00029018 00 00 00 00 48 33 6C 4C 30 57 6F 52 6C 44 00 00 65 loworld"..chmod..
00029029 6C 61 6E 32 00 00 00 65 6C 61 6E 33 00 00 00 63 68 lan2...elan3...ch
0002903a 6D 6F 64 3A 20 6E 6F 74 20 66 6F 75 6E 64 00 00 lang...password:...
0002904b 00 63 61 74 20 2F 70 72 6F 63 2F 63 70 75 69 6E 66 lang...elan3...ch
0002905c 6F 0D 0A 00 47 45 54 20 2F 78 78 2F 72 6E 64 65 2E old lang...getp: lang...getp: lang...getp: lang...getp: lang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...elang...el
```



Elan is French for





The Lotus Elan





Elán

The Slovak rock band (from 1969 and still active)





Network capabilities


- Pivot through firewalls
- Home-made NAT traversal
- Custom-made Proxy service
 - only available to a set of whitelisted IP addresses
- Remotely configured generic network sniffer
- DNS Hijacking



Worm-like behavior

- Tries to replicate via aggressive scanning
- Will dedicate more resources to scan near current external IP
- Will also scan on LAN interfaces
- Will not reinfect an infected device
- Can replicate across architectures
- C&C is made aware of new compromises






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(linear scan from .0 to .255)

Compromise Protocol






Anti-Analysis

- Statically linked binary stripped of its debugging symbols
- Hard to reproduce environment required for malware to operate
- Misleading strings (getcool.com)





Moose Herding

The Malware Operation



Via C&C Configuration


- Network sniffer was used to steal HTTP Cookies
 - Twitter: twll, twid
 - Facebook: c user
 - Instagram: ds user id
 - Google: SAPISID, APISID
 - Google Play / Android: LAY_ACTIVE_ACCOUNT
 - Youtube: LOGIN INFO




Via Proxy Usage Analysis


- Nature of traffic
- Protocol
- Targeted social networks







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
75%+ HTTPS but...




```
Stream Content (1)
```

```
...P6.X.778swan5e..Z.P6.X.GET /hookahleague HTTP/1.1
Host: instagram.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:17.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/17.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US, en; q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Content-Type: text/html
Date:
Location: https://instagram.com/hookahleague/
Server: nginx
Content-Length: 178
Connection: keep-alive
<html>
<head><title>301 Moved Permanently</title></head>
<body bgcolor="white">
<center><h1>301 Moved Permanently</h1></center>
<hr><center>nginx</center>
</body>
```

An Example




An Example (cont.)






An Example (cont.)



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An Example (cont.)




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Anti-Tracking

- Whitelist means we can't use the proxy service to evaluate malware population
- Blind because of HTTPS enforced on social networks
- DNS Hijacking's Rogue DNS servers never revealed





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A Strange Animal



Different focus

- not in the DDoS or bitcoin mining business
- no x86 variant found
- controlled by a single group of actors



Missing "features"

- No persistence mechanism
- No shell access for operators



Thought big, realized little?

- In social network fraud, network sniffer irrelevant
- DNS Hijacking possible but only for few devices
- No ad fraud, spam, DDoS, etc.



Latest Developments




Whitepaper Impact

- Few weeks after the publication the C&C servers went dark
 - After a reboot, all affected devices should be cleaned
 - But victims compromised via weak credentials, so they can always reinfect



Alive or dead?





Alive or dead? (cont.)

- On the lookout for Moose v2
- Looked at over 150 new samples targeting embedded Linux platforms
- Linux/Aidra, Linux/Dofloo (AES.DDoS), Linux/DNSAmp (Mr.Black), Linux.Gafgyt and Linux/Tsunami
- Still no Moose update...



Yay! except...





Moose level-up







Update

New sample this Saturday

- New proxy service port (20012)
- New C&C selection algorithm
- Lots of differences
- Still under scrutiny







Conclusion

Embedded malware

- Not yet complex
- Tools and processes need to catch up
- a low hanging fruit
- Prevention simple



Questions?

Thank you!

- @obilodeau
- and special thanks to Thomas Dupuy (@nyx__o)

